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Parliament is today being recalled from its summer recess to discuss the possibility of British military intervention in
Syria. In the 2012 audit of UK democracy, Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Andrew Blick, and Stephen Crone considered
Parliament’s powers in this area. Although Parliament has debated Britain’s involvement in recent conflicts it has no
formal role in decisions over whether to deploy military force. In this respect, Parliament’s war powers are
significantly weaker than those of legislatures in other countries.
Parliament has limited formal powers over the use of military force. Credit: Prime Minister’s Office (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
Civilian control of the military through the medium of elected representatives is one of the cornerstones of
democracy. It is essential to maintaining the accountability of armed forces personnel to the people, and also
provides a vital – if not in itself sufficient – prerequisite for the legitimation of military entanglements by the state
both at home and abroad. Fortunately, in the UK there are few serious concerns as to the likelihood of the armed
forces ever wresting completely free of democratic control – for example, in a coup d’etat aimed at controlling the
state, in the same way that the military does openly in other countries. However, there are longstanding concerns
that the balance between executive and legislative power over the military may not be configured in such a way as
to ensure the highest possible level of democratic, accountable and transparent military decision-making.
The legal authority under which the UK armed forces operate is complex, involving a mix of statutory powers, which
are within the formal remit of Parliament, and royal prerogative powers, through which the executive can act without
parliamentary approval. Formally speaking, the UK’s armed forces are accountable to Parliament. Each year, it must
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vote either in favour of or against the level of defence expenditure; and every five years, it must renew the legal
basis for the existence of the armed forces and the UK’s system of military law through the passage of an Armed
Forces Bill. Taken together, these arrangements satisfy the stipulation, set out in Article VI of the Bill of Rights 1689,
“That the raising or keeping of a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace unless it be with the consent of
Parliament is against the law.” However, beyond these provisions, Parliament’s powers arguably amount to very
little.
The government, by contrast, enjoys virtually untrammelled power over the day-to-day running of the military by
virtue of the powers vested in it through the royal prerogative. Under the royal prerogative, the government has the
authority to recruit members of the armed forces; appoint commanders and grant commissions to officers; establish
the Defence Council; and make agreements with foreign states about stationing troops on their soil. There is no
legal requirement for Parliament to ratify military commitments which the executive proposes or commences; and
even where parliamentary votes are granted at the discretion of the executive, the decision-making of Parliament is
liable to be handicapped by its ineffective powers of scrutiny over government, as well as a general lack of
resources.
Among other European countries, the UK Parliament has long stood out, in this regard, as a legislature with
extraordinarily weak powers with respect to either determining military policy, or otherwise circumscribing the war-
making capabilities of the executive. As Table One shows, Dieterich et al’s survey of parliamentary war powers
placed the UK among four European democracies in which such powers were found to be ‘very weak’, alongside
Cyprus, France and Greece. It is notable, moreover, that 15 of the 25 European democracies surveyed, a clear
majority, have either ‘very strong’ or ‘strong’ parliamentary war powers. Among the three European comparators
used throughout this Audit – Ireland, the Netherland and Sweden – parliamentary war powers were defined to be
‘strong’.
Table One: Typology of parliamentary war powers in 25 European democracies
It was only following the invasion of Iraq that the issued raised by the UK’s almost ‘exceptional’ constitutional
arrangement became a significant focus of domestic political debate. Prior to the invasion in 2003, alarming
intelligence claims publicised by the government had formed a crucial part of the case for war – undoubtedly
influencing many MPs in advance of the Commons’ vote in favour of military action in March that year (see the case
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study below). When those claims were later shown to be either exaggerated or false, however, various proposals –
including a number of ultimately unsuccessful private members’ bills – were put forward to strengthen the role of
Parliament in deciding whether or not to deploy troops in future instances. In 2004, a report by the House of
Commons Public Administration Select Committee, which investigated the use of prerogative powers in general,
recommended that legislation be quickly introduced to increase parliamentary control over their use. In 2006,
meanwhile, an investigation by the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution  on the subject of
Parliament’s role in war-making specifically concluded that ‘the exercise of the royal prerogative by the government
to deploy armed forces overseas is outdated’ and recommended the establishment of a parliamentary convention
outlining the role which Parliament ought to play in such instances.
Case study: the Iraq war and Parliament
Circumstances surrounding the Iraq War of 2003 served to highlight the pitfalls associated with the
concentration of power at the executive level, and the difficulties that Parliament can experience in
contributing to the democratic process
Parliament was unable to recall itself from recess in the autumn of 2002, when it seemed an invasion
of Iraq was looming, because the power to reconvene it effectively resides with the executive.
The votes that were held in the Commons in advance of the operation in February and March 2003
took place not because they were formally required, but because the government decided they were
politically necessary. Furthermore, ministers – and in particular the Prime Minister – enjoyed
significant flexibility over such matters as the timing of the votes, the information that was provided to
parliamentarians and the motions that were put.
Parliament could not obtain expert advice of its own on the international legality of the action, and did
not have a right to view all the work of the government’s most senior law officer, the attorney general.
Finally, when the time came to investigate the Iraq War, inquiries held outside Parliament obtained
better access to witnesses and evidence, and received more public attention, than those held within
Parliament.
Previous research by Democratic Audit and partner organisations has shown that around 85 per cent of the public
believe that ‘Parliament as a whole’ should decide Britain’s foreign policy objectives. Yet talk of giving parliament an
entitlement to approve troop deployments – whether by statute or some other means – has thus far amounted to
nothing. The Blair government was unmoved by appeals to establish such a right, arguing bluntly that it must be the
government which takes the decision to make war, not Parliament. And while Gordon Brown on a number of
occasions indicated his desire to give Parliament a codified role on troop deployment – as part of a wider review of
the royal prerogative – this did not materialise during his time as Prime Minister, either. Since its formation, the
coalition government has itself appeared sympathetic to the idea of creating an explicitly legal commitment for
government to consult Parliament before engaging in military action. However, it seems that little has been done so
far to bring forward the legislation necessary to do so. Indeed, while the government did seek the approval of
Parliament to use military force in the case of the Libyan intervention in 2011, it is arguably telling that it did so only
after attacks against Muammar Gaddafi’s forces had already begun.
It is also worth noting that the royal prerogative extends to cover the conduct of diplomacy, which has a direct
association with military policy. Until 2010 and the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, Parliament had
(with certain exceptions) no formal role in treaty-making. Once again, this is an area of government activity with a
direct bearing on the deployment of the armed forces – for instance UK involvement in Afghanistan since 2001 has
been in fulfilment of its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty mutual defence clause. Under the 2010 act,
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Parliament was given a statutory part in treaty-making, but one which seems unlikely to make a substantial
difference to its practical power.
This post is based on extracts from the 2012 audit of UK democracy. For further discussion see section 2.5.1 Civilian
control over the armed forces and section 2.4 The democratic effectiveness of Parliament. 
Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Andrew Blick, and Stephen Crone are the authors of the 2012 Democratic Audit report. 
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